How do Executives Exercise their Stock Options?


Klein, Daniel ; Maug, Ernst


[img]
Preview
PDF
B598Dd01.pdf - Published

Download (354kB)

URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/31594
Additional URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342316
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-315943
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2010
Place of publication: Rochester, NY
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > ABWL u. Corporate Finance (Maug)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: G30 , M52,
Keywords (English): Stock potions , exercises , executive compensation
Abstract: We analyze a large data set of stock option exercises for a large data set of almost 200,000 option packages for more than 16,000 US top executives and analyze their motivations for the early exercise of their stock options. We estimate a hazard model to identify the main variables that influence executives´ timing decisions and find that behavioral factors (e.g. , trends in past stock prices), institutional factors (vesting dates, grant dates, blackout periods) an inside information strongly influence the timing of stock option exercises. By contrast, we find little support for the influence of variables proposed by utility-based models.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




Metadata export


Citation


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item