Cartel overcharges and the deterrent effect of EU competition law


Smuda, Florian


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/32497
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-324973
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2012
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 12-050
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > Zentrum für Europ. Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: L13 , L41 , L44,
Subject headings (SWD): Kartell , Betriebliche Preispolitik , Wettbewerbsaufsicht , Strafe , EU-Wirtschaftsrecht , EU-Staaten
Keywords (English): Cartels , overcharges , Europe , fines , deterrence , damages
Abstract: This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge estimates and several parametric and semi- parametric estimation procedures, the impact of different cartel charac- teristics and the market environment on the magnitude of overcharges is analyzed. The mean and median overcharge rates are found to be 20.70 percent and 18.37 percent of the selling price and the average cartel du- ration is 8.35 years. Certain cartel characteristics and the geographic region of cartel operation influence the level of overcharges considerably. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that the currently existing fine level of the EU Guidelines is too low to achieve optimal deterrence.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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