Patent pools in input markets


Reisinger, Markus ; Tarantino, Emanuele



URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843531
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2016
The title of a journal, publication series: Discussion papers / CEPR
Volume: 11512
Place of publication: Washington, DC
Publishing house: Center for Economic and Policy Research
ISSN: 0265-8003
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Mikroökonomik (Juniorprofessur) (Tarantino 2014-)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: K11 , L41 , M2,
Keywords (English): Antitrust Policy , Complementary Patents , FRAND , Patent Pools and Joint Marketing Agreements , Vertical Integration and Restraints
Abstract: We show that patent pools formed by owners of perfectly complementary patents are anticompetitive if one of the licensors is integrated with a manufacturer. With vertical integration, the pool serves as coordination device, allowing patent holders to restrict supplies to the product market and share the larger profits of the affiliated manufacturer. These results are robust to entry, the contractual and competitive environments. The imposition of an unbundling and pass-through requirement makes patent pools socially desirable. We also show that this requirement is more effective than a mandated non-discriminatory policy enforcing FRAND commitments in screening anticompetitive pools.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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Reisinger, Markus ; Tarantino, Emanuele (2016) Patent pools in input markets. Discussion papers / CEPR Washington, DC 11512 [Working paper]


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